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Abstract
This paper studies (i) the effects of external directors and managerial ownership, and 
(ii) the effects of shareholder monitoring, on risk-taking at banks. The former is part 
of the internal control mechanisms, the latter of external control. It also examines 
the difference between control mechanisms in the UK and in Japan. It shows that 
shareholder supremacy is likely to weaken corporate governance at banks. In particular, 
it finds that: (i) the substituted effects between internal and external controls differ 
between countries, or that the substituted effects of governance mechanisms may 
not exist; (ii) an internal corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy 
increases risk-taking at banks; and (iii) foreign shareholders are likely to increase 
risk-taking at banks.
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Effective corporate governance mechanisms arguably provide internal and 
external controls to monitor risk-taking at banks and to safeguard the interests 
of shareholders. Yet, effective internal and external controls are likely to vary 
across countries due to, amongst others, different financial systems,1 labour 
market structures,2 cultures3 and institutional frameworks.4
The conventional views are that the Japanese corporate governance model is 
composed of strong internal controls and weak external controls as a result of 
the weak market for corporate control and regulatory forbearance.5 Moreover, 
the Japanese corporate governance model is considered to be a hybrid model, 
in which its corporate governance mechanism sits somewhere between stake-
holder and shareholder supremacy.6
In contrast, the UK corporate governance model is considered to emphasise 
shareholder supremacy.7 The model consists of strong external controls and 
relatively weak internal controls.8 Mechanisms such as board independence 
* A part of this paper was developed during Ka Wai Mak’s Ph.D. studies at soas University 
of London. Ka Wai would like to thank Dr. Shinozawa and Dr. Lawal for their supervision 
during her PhD.The opinions expressed are solely those of the author, Ebbe Rogge, and in 
no way represent those of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets, The Netherlands. 
We would like to thank Zeeshan Mansoor, Ilya Kokorin and in particular the anonymous 
referees for providing comments on an earlier version.
1 F. Allen and D. Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge, Mass: mit Press, 2000).
2 R. P. Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany Versus the 
Anglo-Saxons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3 K. Li, D. Griffin, H. Yue, and L. Zhao, “How Does Culture Influence Corporate Risk-Taking?”, 
Journal Corporate Finance 23 (2013) 1–22.
4 M. Aoki, Corporate Governance and Institutional Complementarily, in: Information, 
Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity: Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and 
the Transitional Economies (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 60–75.
5 Allen and Gale (n 1); C.W. Anderson and T.L. Campbell ii, “Corporate Governance 
of Japanese Banks”, Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 327–354; J-K.Kang and A. 
Shivdasani, “Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in 
Japan”, Journal of Financial Economics 38 (1995) 29–58.
6 M. Aoki, Comparative Corporate Governance, in: Toward a Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, Comparative Institutional Analysis (Cambridge, Mass: mit Press, 2001) pp. 279–
306; Dore (n 2).
7 S. Arcot, V. Bruno and A. Faure-Grimaud, “Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply 
or Explain Approach Working?”, International Review of Law and Economics 30(2) (2010) 
193–201.
8 Allen and Gale (n 5).
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and performance-based remuneration are designed to align its interests with 
those of its shareholders.9
However, the existing literature focusing on the individual and joint effects 
of internal and external controls only provides limited evidence or information 
on the risk-taking behaviours of banks. This study, first, provides two dimen-
sions of controls by examining: (i) the effects of external directors and manage-
rial ownerships, which are used as internal governance mechanisms to align the 
interests of shareholders; and (ii) the effects of shareholder monitoring. Second, 
this study compares the control mechanisms between the UK and Japan.
This paper attempts to address the research gap by providing a two-dimen-
sional control framework. It argues that, despite the differences between the 
two countries, their internal and external control mechanisms are designed to 
promote shareholder supremacy, which in turn results in increased levels of 
risk-taking at banks.
The conventional arguments offer a comparison of the governance effec-
tiveness between internal and external controls, which oppose the view that 
external monitoring may be substituted for weak internal monitoring, or vice 
versa.10
This study argues that the substitution framework between internal and 
external controls is likely to differ as a result of shareholder supremacy, as 
the mechanisms for the corporate governance approach to shareholder 
supremacy weakens the internal governance of UK-listed and Japan-listed 
banks, and promotes risk-taking. This is because, first, external directors rep-
resent the interests of shareholders, such as wealth maximisation. Second, 
external directors with longer tenures are eager to prove their abilities to 
their current and prospective employers and the associate shareholders. 
Hence, external directors with longer tenures encourage greater risk-taking 
at banks. Third, managerial ownerships align the interests of shareholders, 
who encourage managers to act in the interests of their shareholders who 
forgo risk monitoring for wealth maximisation. Fourth, this study argues that 
9 M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4) (1976) 305–360.
10 S. Fung and S-C. Tsai, “Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance”, 
Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l’Administration 29 (2012) 348–365; K.A. Kim, 
P. Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and J.R. Nofsinger, “Large Shareholders, Board 
Independence, and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe”, Journal 
of Corporate Finance 13 (2007) 859–880; M.S. Weisbach, “Outside Directors and 
ceo Turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 431–460; O.E. Williamson, 
“Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control”, The Journal of Law and 
Economics 26 (1983) 351–366.
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the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring on bank risk-taking behaviours 
may vary, depending on their investment objectives. Therefore, the effects of 
shareholder monitoring on UK-listed and Japan-listed banks differ.
Figure 1 shows the proposed risk-monitoring model between the UK and 
Japan, which argues that shareholders of UK-listed banks are likely to encour-
age their investee banks to take greater risks for greater returns. Similarly, 
foreign shareholders of Japan-listed banks are also likely to encourage their 
investee banks to take risks for the same reason. Because these shareholders 
can diversify their investment risks by investing in a number of companies and 
banks in their portfolios, they are likely to encourage their investee banks to 
take greater risks for greater expected returns.
On the contrary, domestic shareholders of Japan-listed banks are likely 
to discourage risk-taking at their investee banks, because their sharehold-
ers are required to safeguard the interests of their stakeholders, who focus 
on employment stability and business continuation, instead of shareholder 
wealth maximisation. As a result, domestic shareholders act as effective risk 
monitors.
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical back-
grounds and overviews of the internal and external governance mechanisms, 
and of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. Section 3 reviews the comparative 
corporate governance literature as well as empirical literature focusing on 
Anglo-American and Japanese governance frameworks. Section 4 provides 
data, variables, summary statistics, and the methodology used in the empir-
ical assessments. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and places it 
in the context of existing literature as outlined in Section 3. Section 6 dis-










figure 1 Risk Monitoring Model: The UK versus Japan
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2.1 Overviews on Corporate Governance – Internal versus External
The majority of corporate governance studies are commonly divided into stud-
ies of internal and external corporate governance.11 Internal corporate govern-
ance is concerned with the internal controls of a company. The internal control 
mechanisms describe how the board, the highest level of control within a com-
pany, can exercise its control over decisions made by senior management.12 
Elements such as the performance and skills of the board and senior manage-
ment play an important role in internal corporate governance. Mechanisms of 
internal control include the appointment of external directors, the introduc-
tion of performance-based incentives, and board composition.
External corporate governance concerns the external elements which seek 
to control a company. In particular, it concerns the control exerted by capital 
markets. It arguably serves as another level of control in the event that the con-
trols of internal corporate governance have failed. An example thereof would 
be that management from the outside could improve performance over the 
incumbent inefficient management, resulting in a takeover. In this context, the 
possibility of a hostile takeover thus serves as an external mechanism to con-
trol management. Investors, but also creditors, are therefore in a position to 
exert control over a company.13
2.2 Overviews of UK-Listed and Japan-Listed Banks
The main difference in the current context between UK-listed and Japan-listed 
banks is that the former operate under a shareholder supremacy approach, 
whilst the latter operate under a mix of shareholder- and stakeholder suprem-
acy.14 The objective of the two is therefore quite different: UK banks are likely 
to pursue shareholder value,15 whilst Japanese banks are expected to oper-
ate the intent to benefit their associate companies, even if their actions are 
11 J.P. Walsh and J.K. Seward, “On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control 
Mechanisms”, The Academy of Management Review 15(3) (1990) 421–458.
12 E.F. Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy 88 
(1980) 288–307.
13 A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal of Political 
Economics 94 (1986) 461–488.
14 Dore (n 2).
15 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities – Final Recommendations, (26 Nov 2009) https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/+/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf.
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detrimental to shareholder returns.16 These actions have implications for inter-
nal controls mechanisms. In a stakeholder approach, these may be extended 
to include, for example, the appointment of external directors to specifically 
safeguard stakeholder interests,17 ensure performance-based rewards contain 
a long-term element,18 or allow stakeholders to have their representatives on 
the board, e.g. employee representatives.19
Both UK-listed banks and Japan-listed banks are subject to regulatory over-
sight. Although national implementations may differ, significant parts of the 
regulatory framework are similar due to the agreement at the international 
level on important aspects such as capital requirements. Overall, the research 
question is whether there is a difference between the effects of internal and 
external controls on risk-taking between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. As 
stated earlier, the former operates under the shareholder supremacy approach 
and the latter under a mix of shareholder- and stakeholder supremacy.
2.3 Connection with Agency Theory
There are various theories describing corporate governance. In the current 
context, it is useful to consider the problem of controlling a company in light 
of the separation of ownership and control.20 Agency theory describes how 
dispersed shareholders can influence the board to look after their company. 
Put differently, it is concerned with the problem of how owners can influence 
their agents to look after their property, i.e. the company.21 Assuming that the 
agents act in their self-interest, rather than in the interest of other stakehold-
ers, the owners need to incentivise the agents to act in the interest of the prop-
erty. In doing so, the owners introduce agency costs to align the interests of the 
agents with their own interests.
16 K. Nishiguchi, “Future Perspective on Financial Businesses Centering on Risk 
Management”, Public Policy Review 7 (2011) 51–107.
17 R.V. Aguilera, “Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: an Institutional 
Comparative Perspective”, British Journal Management 16 (2005), S39–S53.
18 O. Falck and S. Heblich, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well By Doing Good”, 
Business Horizons 50 (2007) 247–254.
19 J. Goodstein, K. Gautam, and W. Boeker, “The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on 
Strategic Change”, Strategic Management Journal 15(3) (1994) 241–250; J. Pfeffer and G.R. 
Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1978).
20 A.A Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Macmillan, 1932).
21 M.M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1995).
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The above sets out agency theory in its most basic form. It was, however, 
developed in a much wider corporate governance setting.22 Agency theory 
extends to include, for example, employers and employees, or companies and 
creditors. These act in the same way as the previously described owners and 
agents. Note that, when described in this broader setting, agency theory is 
closely linked with contractual theory. This theory describes the company as a 
nexus of contracts,23 where contracts can be explicit or implicit, describing the 
relationship between various actors. Monitoring and enforcing the contracts 
may be compared with agency costs.
Agency costs arise when banks take excessive risks, which are likely to be 
caused by: (i) insufficient management oversight due to a lack of experience 
and/or skills;24 and (ii) management attempts in increase the financial per-
formances of their companies (i.e. banks) at the expense of taking excessive 
risks.25 Nevertheless, risk-taking activities are likely to raise social costs at 
banks.26 For example, excessive risk-taking increases the levels of banking sys-
tem fragility, bank failures and/or runs.
3 Corporate Governance in the UK and Japan
3.1 The UK’s Corporate Governance Framework
The UK corporate governance framework consists of the Combined Code, 
and the Stewardship Code, which focus on internal and external governance, 
respectively. The Combined Code is consolidated from the Cadbury Report27 
(1992) and other corporate governance reports such as the Greenbury Report 
(1995), the Hampel Report (1988), the Turnbull Report (1999), the Myners 
22 K.M. Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and Review”, Academy of Management 
Review 14 (1989) 57–74. E.F. Fama and M.C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control”, 
The Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983) 301–325; Jensen and Meckling (n 9).
23 R.H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica 4 (1937) 386–405; Eisenhardt (n 22); 
Jensen and Meckling (n 9).
24 A.N. Berger, T. Kick and K. Schaeck, “Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking”, 
Journal of Corporate Finance 28 (2014) 48–65.
25 B. Minton, J.P.A. Taillard and R. Williamson, “Do Independence and Financial Expertise 
of the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance?”, Fisher College of Business Working 
Paper No. 2010-03-014 (2010) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1661855.
26 K. Alexander, “Corporate Governance and Banks: The Role of Regulation in Reducing the 
Principal-Agent Problem”, Journal of Banking Regulation 7 (2006) 17–40.
27 Sir A. Cadbury, The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) http://www.ecgi.org/
codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
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Report (2001), the Higgs Review (2003), the Smith Report (2003), Parker review 
(2016) and Hampton-Alexander Review (2018).28
The Combined Code defines corporate governance as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’, and primarily promotes board effective-
ness. In its original version, the Cadbury Report sets out that the board is respon-
sible for the governance of the company, and that the role of the shareholders is 
to appoint directors and auditors, as well as ensuring an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. Note that the Code works on a comply-or-explain basis for 
those companies with a Premium Listing of shares in the UK. Such companies 
must report their compliance as part of their annual report and accounts.
The Stewardship Code29 is designed to promote stewardship effectiveness, 
to encourage shareholder monitoring through active engagements with their 
investee companies and to encourage them to disclose their monitoring pol-
icies. The Stewardship Code emphasises transparency and disclosure. Those 
firms who want to sign up to this code must publish an annual Stewardship 
Report in which they set out their compliance with the code. The Financial 
Reporting Council will then assess this report, and whether the firm is allowed 
to become a signatory.
These concepts do, however, have their drawbacks. Bainbridge argues that 
investor activism is a rare and limited thing in practice, and activist investors 
may not pursue the same goals as more passive investors.30 Moreover, the 
Stewardship Code will apply to UK domestic investors, which given dispersed 
ownership are likely to be in the minority, or at least not have sufficient influ-
ence to make a meaningful impact.31 This observation is further supported by 
the Kay Review, which confirms that in 1981 under three percent of UK shares 
was foreign owned, yet in 2010 this number has increased dramatically, with well 
over forty percent being foreign owned.32 Furthermore, the comply-or-explain 
concept underlying the Combined Code provides guidance for investors, and 
28 For an overview of these reports, see: Cambridge University Judge Business School, ‘Further 
Corporate Governance Reports’ http://cadbury.cjbs.archios.info/report/further-reports.
29 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code 2020 (2020) https://www.frc.org.
uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Dec-19-
Final-Corrected.pdf.
30 S. Bainbridge, New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2008).
31 B.R. Cheffins, “The Stewardship’s Code Achilles Heel”, Modern Law Review 73 (2010) 1004 
– 1025.
32 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (July 2012) https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf, in particular Table 1, 
p. 31.
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allows investors to assess corporate governance practices and their effectiveness 
of investee companies. Increased pressures by investors towards adopting the 
UK corporate governance practices is needed to ensure (listed) companies pro-
actively adopt such practices highlighted in the Code.33
Both the Combined Code and the Stewardship Code are two key elements of 
‘soft law’ governing the corporate governance practices of UK companies. The 
former aims to make companies more accountable to their shareholders and 
stakeholders. The latter seeks to make investors, such as pension fund man-
agers, more accountable to their beneficiaries. From a binding, or mandatory, 
point of view, the responsibilities of directors are emphasised under sections 
172–174 of the Companies Act 2006. In particular, under s172(1), directors have 
a duty to promote the success of the company whilst having regard for employ-
ees, suppliers, customers, and others as well impact on the community and 
environment.34 It thus progresses from its predecessor, in the Companies Act 
1985 s309, which merely stated directors should have regard for ‘the interests 
of the company’s employees in general, as well as the interest of its members’. 
One could therefore argue the new s172-174 go beyond ordinary shareholder 
value to some form of ‘enlightened shareholder value’, perhaps moving towards 
stakeholders more broadly.
Specific to UK banks, there are two additional reports worth mention-
ing, both commissioned as a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis: the 
Walker Review35 (2009) and the Report by the Independent Commission on 
Banking36 (2011), with the former being the most relevant for this research. 
The Walker Review concludes, amongst others, that better engagement from 
shareholders is needed. It appears that short-termism is prevalent, which can 
also be observed by the fact that exiting appears to be preferred over having 
a voice and monitoring.37 More shareholder engagement at banks appears 
33 I. MacNeil, “Activism and Collaboration among Shareholders in UK Companies”, Capital 
Markets Law Journal 5 (2010) 419–439.
34 See also: P.L. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company 
law (9th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) in particular Chapter 16: Directors’ Duties.
35 Walker (n 15).
36 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report – Recommendations, (Sep 2011) 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120827143059/http://bankingcommission.
independent.gov.uk/.
37 A. Reisberg, “The Role of Institutional Shareholders: Stewardship and the Long-/Short-
term Debate”, in: I.H-Y. Chui (ed), The Law on Corporate Governance in Banks (Edward 
Elgar, 2015).
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to be required, but of course not in the short-term activist sense, but in the 
long-term stewardship sense.38
Specific to corporate governance at banks, and in line with the observations 
made by the Walker Review, there is an increased emphasis on sound risk man-
agement and internal controls.39 However, Kokkinis argues that the governance 
structure at banks may result in excessive risk taking: incentives provided by an 
‘agency-theory corporate governance framework’ may not be suited for banks, 
as they appear not to address corporate governance issues, or worse, provide 
the wrong incentives exacerbating the issues.40 It is argued that bank opac-
ity makes it difficult to balance the public interest with shareholder interest. 
Furthermore, incentives provided to the board in terms of remuneration are 
subject to legislative changes, although some have queried to what extent such 
legislative reforms are capable of creating an appropriate framework.41 Other 
authors, however, do make proposals in this area. Ferrarini argues how to align 
incentives with different interests considering systemic risk: deferred equi-
ty-linked pay would ensure alignment with shareholders; remuneration linked 
to the price of debt or credit default swaps for alignment with bondholders, and 
clawback or malus arrangements for alignment with the public interest.42
3.2 Japan’s Corporate Governance Framework
Before setting out the corporate governance framework in Japan, it is worth 
noting that, as with any legal comparison across jurisdictions, one comes 
across issues of comparative law.43 In the field of corporate governance,44 and 
38 M.C. Ungureanu, “Engagement of Institutional Investors”, in: D. Busch, G. Ferrarini, and G. 
van Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2019).
39 L. van Setten, “Risk, Risk Management, and Internal Controls”, in: D. Busch, G. Ferrarini, 
and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
2019).
40 A. Kokkinis, “A Primer in Corporate Governance on Banks and Financial Institutions: Are 
Banks Special?”, in: I.H-Y. Chui (ed), The Law on Corporate Governance in Banks (Edward 
Elgar, 2015).
41 M. Moore, “Design and Control of Remuneration in UK Banks”, in: I.H-Y. Chui (ed), The 
Law on Corporate Governance in Banks (Edward Elgar, 2015).
42 G. Ferrarini, “Compensation in Financial Institutions: Systemic Risk, Regulation, and 
Proportionality”, in: D. Busch, G. Ferrarini, and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of 
Financial Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2019).
43 P. Legrand, “How to Compare Now”, Legal Studies 16(2) (1996) 232–242; K. Zweigert and H. 
Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University, 1998).
44 L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance”, Stanford Law Review 52 (1999) 127–170; J. Clarke, “Asset/Liability 
management A Year of Improving Economic Outlook 2011”, Mass. Fam. Bus. (2011) 
12–15; A.R. Pinto, “Globalization and the Study of Comparative Corporate Governance”, 
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especially in relation to Japan,45 this is a well-trodden path. It is essential to keep 
in mind the context of different histories, economies and cultures46 to ensure 
a sensible comparison is made and that any conclusions are sound. Therefore, 
before setting out and discussing the hard- and soft law aspects of corporate 
governance in Japan, it is important to explain briefly the working of Japan’s 
corporate environment.
Japan’s corporate landscape traditionally consists of groups of companies 
working closely together: the so-called Keiretsu.47 Apart from studies focus-
ing on business groups,48 scholars have attempted to examine the hybrid 
Japan corporate governance framework49 by assessing the effects of the life-
time employment,50 the board structures of Japanese companies,51 their 
performance-incentive schemes52 and the ownership structures.53 In addition, 
contrary to the Anglo-American shareholder-investee relationship, the domes-
tic shareholder monitoring mechanism is considered to be unique in Japan, 
because shareholders are likely to be affiliated with a company, or in the cur-
rent context, with a bank.54
Wisconsin International Law Journal 23 (2005) 477–504; M.J. Roe, “Some Differences in 
Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States”, Yale Law Journal 102 (1993) 
1927–2003.
45 Nottage (n 40).
46 D. Nelken, “Using the Concept of Legal Culture”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29 
(2004) 1–28.
47 M.L. Gerlach, Alliance Capitalism: the Social organization of Japanese business (Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press, 1992); K. Miyashita and D. Russell, Keiretsu: Inside the Hidden 
Japanese Conglomerates (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994).
48 M. Aoki, “Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm”, Journal of Economic Literature 
28 (1990) 1–27.
49 See generally: D.H. Whittaker and S. Deakin (eds), Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Reform in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2009); S. Learmount, Corporate Governance: 
What can be learned from Japan? (Oxford University Press, 2002).
50 T. Araki, “Corporate Governance Reforms, Labor Law Developments, and the Future of 
Japan’s Practice-Dependent Stakeholder Model”, Japan Labor Review 2 (2005) 26–57.
51 T. Yoshikawa and P.H. Phan, “Alternative Corporate Governance Systems in Japanese 
Firms: Implications for a Shift to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance”, Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management 18 (2001) 183–205.
52 K. Kubo and T. Saito, “The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Company 
Presidents and Firm Performance in Japan”, The Japanese Economic Review 59 (2008) 
401–418.
53 S.M. Jacoby, “Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan”, in: D.H. Whittaker 
and S.F. Deakin (eds.), Corporate Governance and Managerial Reform in Japan (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 93–133.
54 Aoki (n 6).
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Generally speaking, Japanese law is comprised of both foreign, imported 
laws, as well as domestic elements.55 Until 2005, the Commercial Code was 
essentially what one would call the Japanese company law. Since the crisis in 
the 1990s, several proposals for legal reform were introduced to improve corpo-
rate governance practices. For example, the Big Bang Reforms of 1996 and the 
Laws for Financial System Reformation of 1998 were designed to improve the 
financial system. More generally, from the early 1990s to well into the nough-
ties incremental changes were made to the Commercial Code.56 In 2005, the 
Company Law was enacted, lifting these elements out of the Commercial 
Code. The Company Law includes, for example, a choice of governance struc-
ture based upon whether a company is classified as a large or non-large com-
pany. Whilst non-large companies have a variety of choices, large companies 
must choose between a new US-style board system with a committee struc-
ture, or the existing option requiring only a board, corporate auditor, and an 
accounting firm. In any case, a public company must have a board of directors 
comprised of at least three directors which can be appointed and dismissed 
by a normal majority at a shareholders’ meeting. The board must, amongst 
the directors, appoint representative directors to conduct the business of the 
company.
Next to this legal framework, the Japanese investment communities and 
regulatory authorities – the Japan Corporate Governance Network,57 the Japan 
Pension Fund Association and the Financial Services Agency – also encour-
age institutional shareholders to actively monitor their investee companies 
through engagement and voting activities, and to disclose their engagement 
and voting policies.58 There are also various codes relating to corporate 
55 See generally: H. Baum and M. Bälz, Handbuch Japanisches Handels- und Wirtschaftrecht 
(Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2011); H. Oda, Japanese Law, (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2009); J.M. Ramseyer and M. Nakazato, Japanese Law: an Economic Approach 
(University of Chicago Press, 1999); and H. Tanaka and M.D.H. Smith, The Japanese Legal 
System: Introductory Cases and Materials (University of Tokyo Press, 1976).
56 H. Baum and M. Bälz, (n 55); R.J. Gilson and C.J. Milhaupt, “Choice as Regulatory Reform: 
The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance”, American Journal of Comparative Law 53 
(2005) 343–377.
57 The Japanese Corporate Governance Network was established in 2012, comprised of three 
former organisations: the Japanese Corporate Governance Forum, the Japan Independent 
Directors Network, and the Japan Corporate Governance Research Institute, see: https://
www.cg-net.jp/english/profile.html.
58 B.E. Aronson, “A Japanese Calpers or a New Model for Institutional Investor Activism – 
Japan’s Pension Fund Association and the Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan”, 
New York University Journal of Law & Business (2011) 571–640; Financial Services Agency, 
Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors ≪Japan’s Stewardship Code≫ – To Promote 
Sustainable Growth of Companies through Investment and Dialogue (2014).
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governance, for example, the Stewardship Code of February 2014, revised June 
2017 and March 2020,59 and the Corporate Governance Code of June 2015, 
revised June 2018.60 The former, which is voluntary, established code of con-
duct for investors, whilst the latter, which operates on a comply-or-explain 
basis, sets outs fundamental principles for corporate governance practices at 
listed firms. One of the interesting aspects of these codes is that they focus on 
sustainable and increased growth over the mid- to long-term. One of the ways 
they set out to achieve this objective is by encouraging (further) unbundling of 
cross-shareholdings within the Keiretsu business group. This change may allow 
for an increased external control of corporate governance in Japan, resulting 
in an increased accountability of management to shareholders outside their 
business group. At the same time, it could also trigger more interest from for-
eign investors.
3.3 Bank Supervision
Some researchers suggest there are two types of bank supervision: the super-
visory power (i.e. the regulator) and private power (i.e. the market forces).61 
The former corresponds to the official supervisor as meant by Pillar 2 of Basel, 
whilst the latter corresponds with market discipline as meant by Pillar 3 of 
Basel. Focussing on the official supervisors, the UK and Japan’s banking indus-
tries are monitored by their domestic bank supervisory authorities and are 
required to abide by banking and financial regulations, such as holding a min-
imum amount of regulatory capital.
The UK banking industry is composed of foreign and domestic banks. It 
is regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (pra) and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (fca). The pra is responsible for regulating and supervising 
the UK’s banking and financial industries, in particular its financial resources, 
while the fca is customer protection-focused and its objective is to ensure that 
the banking and financial industry operates with integrity. It should be noted 
that the UK regulators have some provisions in their Handbooks that touch on 
59 The Council of Experts on the Stewardship Code, Principles for Responsible Institutional 
Investors: Japan’s Stewardship Code (March 24, 2020) https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/
councils/stewardship/20200324/01.pdf.
60 jpx Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code: Seeking Sustainable 
Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value over the Mid- to Long-Term (June 1, 2018) 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/20180602_en.pdf.
61 F.M. Song and L. Li, “Bank Governance: Concepts and Measurements”, in: J. Barth, C. Lin, 
and C. Wihlborg (eds.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2012).
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corporate governance at their supervised banks. In particular, prin62 sets out 
the principles for business, including that business is conducted with integrity 
and due care and skill and regard for customers; sysc63 sets out senior man-
agement arrangements, including sysc 19 which contains arrangements for 
remuneration.
The Japanese banking industry was traditionally governed under the con-
voy system.64 It was used to safeguard the soundness of the banking indus-
try, in which competition among banks was restricted. As a result of the late 
1990s financial deregulations, the effects of the convoy system diminished. The 
Japanese government allowed large city banks to fail, while providing funds 
to assist with the orderly closure of the failing banks. Competition among 
Japanese banks was gradually allowed to increase.65
The Japanese banking industry is now regulated and monitored by the 
Financial Services Agency66 and the capital markets,67 and the bank regula-
tory monitoring mechanisms are now similar to those of the UK’s. Meanwhile, 
an industry report68 argues that the Japanese government has been implicitly 
supporting the banking industry by showing a willingness to support weak 
banks by direct equity injection and to avoid public bond defaults.
Despite the differences between the monitoring mechanisms of these two 
countries, banks operating in both countries must maintain the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio, acquire deposit insurance, and abide by financial reg-
ulations such as market abuse regulation, competition laws and anti-money 
laundry regulations. At the same time, it raises the question how aspects of 
corporate law and financial regulation interact in corporate governance at 
banks. Some authors conclude that there is tension between national cor-
porate law and financial regulation, for example due to requirements on the 
62 Financial Conduct Authority, Principles for Business (2020) https://www.handbook.fca.org.
uk/handbook/PRIN.pdf.
63 Financial Conduct Authority, Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(2020) https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PRIN.pdf.
64 Nishiguchi (n 16).
65 J.A. Bikker and L. Spierdijk, “How Banking Competition Changed Over Time”, Discussion 
Paper Series No. 08–04 Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht University (2008); 
M. Imai, “The Emergence of Market Monitoring in Japanese Banks: Evidence from the 
Subordinated Debt Market”, Journal of Banking & Finance 31 (2007) 1441–1460.
66 K. Murata and M. Hori, ‘End of the Convoy System and the Surge of Market Discipline’ 
ESRI Discussion Paper Series No. 105m Economic and Social Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan 
(2004).
67 N. Baba and M. Inada, “Why do Japanese Regional Banks Issue Subordinated Debts?”, 
Japan and the World Economy 21 (2009) 358–364; Imai, (n 65).
68 Moody’s, Moody’s Confirms Subordinated Debt Ratings of Japanese Banks (2013).
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board or on shareholdership, and by creating such common requirements 
would effectively harmonise aspects of national company law regimes.69 In 
particular, it can be argued that the goals and incentives for the board derived 
from company law might not necessarily align with the regulatory prudential 
objectives, and banks would need to seek a right balance between taking risk 
in the interests of shareholders and promoting the long-term interest of the 
public and other stakeholders.70
3.4 Empirical Literature
The majority of the empirical research on agency theory focuses on the US 
and the UK by applying the two internal governance mechanisms of independ-
ent directors and performance-based incentive renumeration schemes.71 The 
results, however, are inconclusive.
Studying US companies with a majority of independent or external directors 
in the early 1990s, Mishra and Nielsen72 find that there is a positive relationship 
between board independence and asset returns, whilst observe a negative rela-
tionship.73 Similarly, studying the relationship between performance-based 
remuneration and asset returns, Grove et al.74 and Kor and Sundaramurthy75 
find a positive relationship by using a sample set of US commercial banks and 
US technology firms, respectively. On the contrary, Mudambi and Nicosia76 
find that concentrated share ownerships with internal directors have a nega-
tive impact on asset returns.
In the case of the UK, similar to the US, the external directors are gener-
ally found to be beneficial to their company’s performances. Several research-
ers conclude that directors are likely to align their interests with those of the 
69 K. Lieverse and C. Bulten, “Corporate Law versus Financial Regulatory Rules”, in: D. 
Busch, G. Ferrarini, and G. van Solinge (eds), Governance of Financial Institutions (Oxford 
University Press, 2019).
70 A. Kokkinis, Corporate Law and Financial Stability (Routledge, 2018).
71 Jensen and Meckling, (n 9).
72 C.S. Mishra and J.F. Nielsen, “Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large 
Bank Holding Companies”, Financial Management 29 (2000) 51–69.
73 S. Bhagat and B. Black, “The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and 
Firm Performance”, Business Lawyer 54 (1999) 921–963.
74 H. Grove, L. Patelli, L.M. Victoravich and P.(Tracy) Xu, “Corporate Governance and 
Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 19 (2011) 418–436.
75 Y.Y. Kor and C. Sundaramurthy, ‘Experience-Based Human Capital and Social Capital of 
Outside Directors’, Journal of Management 35(4) (2008) 981–1006.
76 R. Mudambi and C. Nicosia, “Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
the UK Financial Services Industry”, Applied Financial Economics 8(2) (1998) 175–180.
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shareholders.77 In addition, studies focusing on executive remuneration show 
that performance-based remuneration schemes are likely to have positive 
effects on risk-taking.78 This view has been more nuanced by further research, 
which suggests that managers’ share-ownership is positively associated with 
bank risk taking, but personal wealth concentration is negatively associated.79 
Furthermore, long-term incentive plans appear to be associated with more 
bank risk-taking and higher probability of bankruptcy.80
Further insights could be found in the empirical studies focusing on the 
bail-out of several large banks during the 2008 Financial Crisis. Ferreira et. al. 
construct a ‘management insulation index’, which proxies the legal rules on 
allocation of power between the board and shareholders, and indicates the 
extent of the board is insulated in making its decisions from the wishes of the 
banks’ owners.81 The sample set consists of US banks operating in multiple 
States, for which the index is created including the different company law 
provisions applicable in multiple States. Whilst there certainly is merit in this 
methodology, for the purposes of this paper, however, it would be problematic 
to construct such an index: it would have to be workable in both the UK and in 
Japan. From a comparative law point of view, this provides a variety of issues 
and instead share ownership structure is used here as a proxy. It may become 
possible to use the insulation index, if the UK and Japan were to implement 
similar policies to prevent the influence of shareholders.
Thus, in the case of the Ferreira et al. study, the authors use the insulation 
index focusing on different jurisdictions between multiple States in the United 
States. Although their legal structures vary, the majority of the corporate gov-
ernance mechanism is comparable. Their study supports the observation 
77 P. de Andres, and E. Vallelado, “Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the 
Board of Directors”, Journal of Banking and Finance 32(12) (2008) 2570–2580; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, (n 75); Mishra and Nielsen, (n 72).
78 R. Fahlenbrach and R.M. Stulz, “Bank ceo Incentives and the Credit Crisis”, Journal of 
Financial Economics 99 (2011) 11–26; H. Mehran and J.V. Rosenberg, “The Effect of Employee 
Stock Options on Bank Investment Choice, Borrowing, and Capital”, Staff Reports No. 305 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2007); F. Suntheim, ‘Managerial Compensation in the 
Financial Service Industry’, Financial Conduct Authority (2010).
79 K. Spong and R. Sullivan, “Bank Ownership and Risk Taking: Improving Corporate 
Governance in Banking after the Crisis”, in: J. Barth, C. Lin, and C. Wihlborg (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Banking and Governance (Edward Elgar, 2012).
80 R. Ayadi, E. Arbak and W.P. de Groen, “Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking in 
European Banking”, in: J. Barth, C. Lin, and C. Wihlborg (eds.), Research Handbook on 
International Banking and Governance (Edward Elgar, 2012).
81 D. Ferreira, D. Kershaw, T. Kirchmaier, and E. Schuster, Shareholder Empowerment and 
Bank Bailouts, Finance Working Papers (345/2013) ecgi http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56083/.
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that banks with a system of corporate governance with dominant sharehold-
ers performed relatively poorly, whilst banks with managers more insulated 
from shareholder influence performed better. The authors suggest this is due 
to bank shareholders having incentives for excessive risk taking beyond the 
‘socially-optimal level’, pushing the banks towards less traditional and riskier 
activities. These findings are supported by Erkens et. al., who examine how 
thirty banks performed during the crisis.82 They observe that banks with 
higher institutional ownership took more risk, resulting in larger losses.
The empirical literature discussed so far focussed mainly on the UK and 
US. Turning now to Japan, the institutional ownership structures are argua-
bly different from those in the UK. The majority of empirical studies indicate 
that independent or external directors are less effective in Japan,83 where 
scholars find that there is no relationship between percentages of external 
directors and company performances. Horiuchi and Shimizu84 find that 
appointing amakudari as external directors at banks increases the level of 
non-performing loans whilst reducing the capital base. Amakudari can be 
translated as ‘descending from heaven’, meaning appointed external direc-
tors who are retired (semi-) government officials.
Although empirical findings are inconclusive, comparative literature 
suggests that the Anglo-American governance framework highlights the 
importance of market for corporate control, while cross-shareholder mon-
itoring prevails in the Japan framework.85 Scholars further suggest that the 
differences of the effects on corporate earnings and risk-taking between 
the Anglo-American countries and Japan are likely due to the legal frame-
work,86 the culture,87 and the country’s institutional framework.88 The for-
mer two argue that social consciousness is considered in the legal framework 
and cultural values are likely to have effects on levels of risk-taking. Their 
82 D.H. Erkens, M. Hung, and P. Matos, ‘Corporate Governance in the 2007–2008 Financial 
Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide’, Journal of Corporate Finance 18 
(2012) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1397685.
83 I. Bonn, T. Yoshikawa and P.H. Phan, “Effects of Board Structure on Firm Performance: 
A Comparison Between Japan and Australia”, Asian Business & Management 3 (2004) 
105–125.
84 A. Horiuchi and K. Shimizu, “Did Amakudari Undermine the Effectiveness of Regulator 
Monitoring in Japan?”, Journal of Banking and Finance 25 (2001) 573–596.
85 Dore (n 2); S. Prowse, “The Corporate Governance System in Banking: What Do We 
Know?”, PSL Quarterly Review 50 (2014).
86 Nottage (n 45).
87 Li, Griffin, Yue and Zhao (n 3).
88 Dore (n 2).
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empirical findings show that companies operating in ‘harmony’ and ‘uncer-
tainty avoidance’ countries are likely to take fewer risks. The latter argues 
that shareholder monitoring prevails over the effects of market for corporate 
control as a result of cross-shareholding.
4 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
A database was compiled consisting of 582 bank-year observations of 
Japan-listed and UK-listed banks between 2006 and 2013, and were pooled 
from 550 Japan-listed bank-year observations and 32 UK-listed bank-year 
observations. However, compared to the Japanese banking industry, only five 
UK-listed banks provide retail lending.
The data was extracted from the Nikkei Telecom 21 and Orbis (formally 
known as Bankscope) databases. The information relating to the composition 
of Japan-listed bank boards was extracted from the Nikkei Telecom 21 data-
base. Ownership information and balance sheet data were extracted from the 
Orbis database.
Seven hundred and six bank-year observations were extracted, of which 124 
observations were removed due to missing financial information and outliers. 
The sample set is unbalanced.
4.1 Bank Risk-Taking
The level of bank risk-taking is a measure of a bank being insolvent (the 
z-score), in which the lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability 
of insolvency risks at a bank,89 because banks with greater volatilities of earn-
ings present greater risks.











, where the car is the ratio of a bank’s 
total equity to its total assets, and μi,t and σi,t are the mean and standard devi-
ations of the return on assets (roa) of bank i at time t, respectively. The roa is 
defined as the ratio of net income (loss) to total assets.
Table 1 shows that, on average, the z-score of Japan-listed banks is greater 
than those of UK-listed banks, indicating that the incomes of Japan-listed 
banks tend to be less volatile and therefore they are seen as safer banks. 
89 T.H. Hannan and G.A. Hanweck, “Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large 
Certificates of Deposit”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20 (1988) 203–211; A.D. Roy, 
“Safety First and the Holding of Assets”, Econometrica 20 (1952) 431–449.
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However, the range of the z-score of Japan-listed banks is greater than that of 
UK-listed banks, indicating that there is a greater range in the earning volatil-
ities of Japan-listed banks. In addition, UK-listed banks have higher impaired 
loan ratios (ImpLoanR) compared to Japan-listed banks.
4.2 Board Monitoring
This study assesses the theoretical predictions that board independence and 
managerial ownerships affect the risk-taking behaviours of listed banks and 
minimise residual losses, which can be proxied using four variables: levels of 
external directors (ExDir), external director tenures (ExDir_T), internal direc-
tor ownerships (InDir_O) and external director ownerships (ExDir_O). The for-
mer two variables measure the effectiveness of board independence. The latter 
two variables are used to determine the degree of alignment of board directors 
with their shareholders.
4.3 Shareholder Monitoring
The controlling (voting) rights are proxied by the levels of share ownerships, 
which reflect the abilities of shareholders to influence the affairs of their inves-
tee companies.90 Table 1 shows that 10 types of institutional shareholders are 
considered and are assigned into four categories of institutional shareholders: (i) 
foreign financial institutions (ffi), (ii) foreign non-financial institutions (fnfi), 
table 1 Shareholder Categorisation
 fi represents financial institutions. nfi represents non-financial institutions. The 
ownership levels are aggregated according to the following:








Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee fi
Private Equity firms fi
Public (publicly-listed companies) nfi
90 R. La Porta, F. López de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, “Law and finance”, Journal of 
Political Economy 106 (1998) 1113–1155; Shleifer and Vishny (n 15).
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(iii) domestic financial institutions (dfi), and (vi) domestic non-financial 
institutions (dnfi).
This study includes direct ownership information on top 20 shareholders 
who have direct voting rights, and is used to capture the abilities of these 
shareholders to influence risk-taking behaviours at banks.91
4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample set used in the empiri-
cal analyses. The UK-listed banks have a lower z-score and a higher ratio of 
impaired loans (ImpLoanR) compared to Japan-listed listed banks. But the 
data also shows that UK-listed banks, on average, have greater levels of total 
regulatory capital (TCapR) compared to Japan-listed banks. This is very inter-
esting, because it shows that UK-listed banks are likely to take greater risks, 
but also to have greater buffers to absorb any resulting losses due to higher 
regulatory capital reserves.
On board composition, the boards of UK-listed banks are outsider-domi-
nated, and their external directors tend to have longer tenures, while the 
boards of Japan-listed banks are insider-dominated. Table 2 shows that, on 
average, the percentage of external directors at UK-listed banks is 75 percent, 
while that of Japan-listed banks is 10 percent.
The external directors of UK-listed banks do not own any shares in their 
banks. This is not surprising, because the UK Corporate Governance Code pro-
motes board independence and discourages managerial ownerships for exter-
nal/independent directors. On the contrary, the internal and external directors 
of Japan-listed banks own, on average, 0.15 percent and 0.07 percent of their 
bank shares, respectively. The overall levels of managerial ownerships of both 
countries remain low. In terms of director tenure, the average tenure of UK-listed 
banks’ external directors is three years, while that of Japan is two years.
In terms of non-managerial ownership structures in Japan, table 2 shows 
that foreign and domestic financial institutions tend to cumulatively own 
the largest portion of shares in UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. On average, 
domestic and foreign financial institutions own 16.78 percent and 28.30 per-
cent of shares in UK-listed banks, respectively. Similarly, domestic and foreign 
financial institutions own 14.16 percent and 4.97 percent of shares in Japan-
listed banks, respectively.
The correlation matrices in Table 3–5 show that (i) the z-score of UK-listed 
banks is not statistically correlated with the variables of board monitoring and 
91 L. Laeven and R. Levine, “Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking”, Journal of 
Financial Economics 93 (2009) 259–275.
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bonding mechanisms (InDir, ExDir, ExDir_O, ExDir_T) and those of share-
holder cash flow rights (dfi, dnfi, ffi and dnfi), (ii) the z-score of Japan-
listed banks is statistically correlated with dnfi, ffi, ExDir and ExDir_O, 
suggesting that the increased foreign financial institutional ownerships and 
external directors are likely to promote risk-taking behaviours at Japan-listed 
banks. But Japan-listed banks with higher domestic non-financial share own-
erships tend to have lower risks.
In addition, the correlation matrices show that (i) the z-score of UK-listed 
banks is not statistically correlated with the levels of impaired loans 
(ImpLoanR), the total regulatory capital (TCapR) and the market performances 
of banks (TobinQ), but (ii) the z-score of Japan-listed banks is statistically cor-
related with ImpLoanR, TCapR and TobinQ. This indicates that Japan-listed 
banks with greater risk-taking tend to have higher impaired loan ratios and 
better market-based performances, but with lower total regulatory capital.
4.5 Model and Methodology
The levels of board independence, managerial ownerships, and non-manage-
rial shareholdings are used to proxy the effectiveness of board and shareholder 
monitoring.
Z Z M M M *C M
i t i t i t i t i t i t i, , , , , ,
= + + + + +− − − − −α β β β β β1 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 4 1 1 1 5 2 , ,
, , ,
t i t




− − −+ + + +
1 1
6 1 7 1 8 1 9
2008β β β β GDP
i t i t, ,− +1 ε
where Z
i t,
 is the z-score of bank i at time t, M
i t1 1, −  and M i t2 1, −  are matrices of 
bank level board and shareholder monitoring mechanisms at time t-1, C
i t, −1 is 
a categorical variable in which 1 equals UK-listed banks, and 0 equals Japan-
listed banks. The total capital regulatory ratio (TCapR
i t, −1) and levels of mar-
ket-based performance (TobinQ
i t, −1) control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 
controls for year-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 
equals the years 2008–2013, and 0 equals 2005–2007. gdp controls for coun-
try-specific effects.
5 Empirical Findings and Discussions
The overarching messages from the regression results shown in Table 6 are that 
shareholder supremacy weakens bank governance, which is consistent with for 
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example the findings by Ferreira et al. as discussed previously.92 The results in 
Table 6 highlight that (i) the substituted effects between internal and external 
controls differ between countries or that the substituted effects of governance 
mechanisms may not exist, (ii) an internal corporate governance approach to 
shareholder supremacy increases risk-taking at banks, and (iii) foreign share-
holders are likely to increase risk-taking at banks.
Tables 6 and 8 provide a summary of the results. The Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (lm) test is used to test for unobserved heterogeneity, 
and shows that null hypotheses are not accepted and random-effects (re) esti-
mations are suitable. The values of R2(between) are relatively high compared 
to those of R2(within).
The standard errors of regressions in Table 6 are adjusted to control for 
clustering at country and bank levels, and for year-specific effects. The results 
show that internal mechanisms such as external directors (ExDir) and mana-
gerial ownerships (ExDir_O, InDir_O) are positively associated with risk-tak-
ing at UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. The coefficients of ExDir and ExDir_O 
of Japan-listed banks are economically and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. The coefficient of InDir_O of Japan-listed banks are statistically 
significant at the five percent level, but it is not economically significant.
The negative association between foreign shareholders and the z-score 
holds for both UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. Only the coefficients of for-
eign financial institutional ownerships (ffi) and foreign non-financial insti-
tutional ownerships (fnfi) of Japan-listed banks are statistically significant 
at one percent and five percent levels, respectively. The results suggest that 
foreign financial and non-financial institutions are likely to encourage their 
Japan-listed investee banks to increase their risk-taking activities.
In addition, the coefficients of domestic financial institutional owner-
ships (dfi) and domestic non-financial institutional ownerships (dnfi) of 
UK-listed banks are negatively and statistically significant at five percent and 
10 percent levels, respectively. On the contrary, the coefficients of dfi and 
dnfi of Japan-listed banks are positively associated with the z-score, but are 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the coefficients of ffi, fnfi, dfi and 
dnfi are economically insignificant.
Overall, these results suggest that, first, the internal and external controls 
are likely to be ineffective, if the objective of principals and agents is to reduce 
risk-taking at banks. Second, the domestic shareholders of Japan-listed com-
panies are likely to play different roles compared to those of UK-listed banks, 
92 Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier, and Schuster (n 81).
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indicating the possibility that external controls are likely to be sufficient in 
monitoring Japan-listed banks.
Two observations can be found with regard to reducing risk-taking: (i) the 
ineffectiveness of internal controls, and (ii) the ineffectiveness of external con-
trols. First, the results relating to internal controls are consistent with those 
highlighted in Kokkinis’ observation concerning the wrong incentives,93 and 
with Moore’s concerns on being able to create a remuneration scheme in line 
with, amongst others, public interests.94 As regards the ineffectiveness of exter-
nal controls to reduce risk-taking, this finding supports research conducted by 
Ferreira et. al., Erkens et. al., and Bainbridge: Ferreira et. al. finds that when a 
bank’s board is more insulated from the influence of its shareholders, it tends 
to perform better during the 2008 Financial Crisis,95 while Erkens et. al. show 
that banks with higher institutional ownership took more risk and suffered 
larger losses.96 The study of Bainbridge suggests that activist investors may not 
pursue the same goals as more passive investors, indicating that activist inves-
tors are also likely to influence management to take decisions with a focus on 
merely short-term profitability.97 Overall, these studies support the argument 
put forward by Kokkinis that incentives provided by an ‘agency-theory corpo-
rate governance framework’ may not be suited for banks as they may provide 
the wrong incentives, thus exacerbating governance issues.98
The second observation suggests that external controls are likely to be suf-
ficient in monitoring Japan-listed banks. This would correspond with the con-
clusions by Hasan and Song, and Erkens et. al. The study of Hasan and Song 
suggests that banks with larger proportion of controlling shareholders tends 
to perform better.99 Contrary to Japanese banks,100 studying 296 banks in 30 
countries at the centre of the 2008 Financial Crisis (North America, Europe, 
and Australia), Erkens et. al. shows that banks with higher institutional owner-
ship tended to take more risk during the crisis, resulting in larger losses.
93 Kokkinis (n 40).
94 Moore (n 41).
95 Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier, and Schuster (n 81).
96 Erkens, Hung, and Matos (n 82).
97 Bainbridge (n 30).
98 Kokkinis (n 70); and Kokkinis (n 40).
99 I. Hasan and L. Song, “Bank Ownership and Performance: a Global Perspective”, in: J. 
Barth, C. Lin, and C. Wihlborg (eds.), Research Handbook on International Banking and 
Governance (Edward Elgar, 2012).
100 Erkens, Hung, and Matos (n 82).
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6 Additional Robustness Tests
Two robustness tests are conducted. First, the system generalized method 
of moments (gmm) Arellano-Bond system regressions are employed. It is a 
robust procedure which is employed to mitigate the problems of endogeneity 
and simultaneity arising from the regression model estimating the relation-
ship between dependent and independent variables.101 The results of the sys-
tem gmm Arellano-Bond system regressions are shown in Tables 7 and 9. The 
majority of the results are robust, except for the ffi coefficient for the UK.
Second, the majority of the results are robust using an alternative varia-
ble, except for dfi for Japan, and ExDir_T for the UK. The ratio of impaired 
loans, ImpLoanR, is the percentage of impaired loans over gross loans. The 
results are expected to have the opposite signs on the estimated coeffi-
cients when the z-score is replaced with ImpLoanR as the dependent 
variable, because ImpLoanR is negatively correlated with the z-score as 
indicated in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
7 Conclusions
This study offers possible explanations on the substitution frameworks at listed 
banks on internal and external controls between the UK and Japan, which 
focus on the relationships (i) between managerial ownerships and risk-taking, 
and between (ii) between ownership structures and risk-taking, respectively.
The conventional theories propose that, first, the UK corporate framework 
has weak internal controls but strong external controls, in which board inde-
pendence and renumeration schemes are designed to strengthen internal con-
trols, and in which strong external controls result from market for corporate 
control. Second, the Japan corporate framework has strong internal controls 
but weak external controls, which result from the stakeholder-based hybrid 
model and weak market for corporate control,102 respectively.
The results presented in this paper suggest that risk-taking at banks is 
increased by (i) an internal corporate governance approach to shareholder 
supremacy, and (ii) foreign share ownership. This indicates that – contrary to 
101 T. Beck and R. Levine, “Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence”, Journal 
of Banking and Finance 28(3) (2014) 423–442; M.S. Lilling, “The Link between ceo 
Compensation and Firm Performance: Does Simultaneity Matter?”, Atlantic Economic 
Journal 34 (2006) 101–114.
102 Aoki (n 6).
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the conventional theories – UK-listed banks’ internal and external corporate 
governance controls appear to be weak, and Japan-listed banks’ external cor-
porate governance controls appear to be weak but their internal corporate gov-
ernance controls may be undetermined.
Therefore, in bank governance research, agency theory, first, may be insuffi-
cient as researchers are likely to consider the implications of the institutional 
frameworks of the countries being studied. Second, agency theory favours 
shareholder supremacy, which encourages greater risk-taking. These observa-
tions are in line with earlier research. Based on banks’ performance during the 
2008 Financial Crisis, researchers have observed that banks, where manage-
ment was more insulated from shareholder demands, or which had less insti-
tutional investors, performed better.103 Other researchers have suggested that 
the agency model, when applied to banks, provide the wrong incentives, which 
can even worsen the situation.104
The current legal framework tends to favour shareholders,105 resulting in 
managers considering the interests of their shareholders when choosing man-
agement and risk strategies for their companies. The policy implications of 
this study indicate that regulators and policymakers may need to consider fur-
ther improvements towards balancing the interests of the shareholders with 
the stakeholders under the Company Law and corporate governance codes 
or guidelines. Earlier research has shown that the current approach may not 
work.106 One reason for this is the amount of foreign ownership, which is 
supported by this research, because, as suggested by other authors, they may 
simply not be subject to the relevant codes.107 Furthermore, other authors sug-
gest there is clear discrepancy between the interest of activist owners, and the 
passive majority.108 Perhaps the engagement of investors should get a more 
compulsory status, although one would have to be certain they will retain the 
long-term interests rather than the short-term view taken by current activist 
owners.
As a final word of caution, it should be noted that risk-taking does not nec-
essarily equate to excessive risk taking; it may well be that increased risk taking 
is well within the defined risk appetite and policy as defined by the bank.
103 Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier, and Schuster (n 81).
104 Kokkinis (n 40).
105 B. Segrestin and A. Hatchuel, “Beyond Agency Theory, a Post-crisis View of Corporate 
Law”, British Journal of Management 22 (2011) 484–499.
106 Kokkinis (n 70); and Kokkinis (n 40).
107 Cheffins (n 31); and The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, 
(n 32).
108 Bainbridge (n 30).
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